
In addition to promoting religious solidarity, the people involved in the protest have done some remarkable organizational work in a country plagued by inefficiency and corruption. Another BBC story features an interactive map of Tahrir Square during the protests. Clicking on "street clinic" reveals an ad hoc medical clinic set up to help injured protesters, and the caption reads: "Since Egyptians do not typically have access to free medical care, some say the clinics in the square are an improvement on what they are used to." Clicking on "Rubbish bins" reveals a recycling system set up by some of the demonstrators. While this may not seem like much to those of us accustomed to well-organized recycling systems, it struck me as astonishing given the state of Cairo's trash system when I lived there. Cairo is a very dirty city: there are basically no trash bins, and people tend to just throw their trash on the ground. That the demonstrators would set up a *recycling* system illustrates, I think, how different these protesters are from the previously ruling regime: they are much younger, much more globally aware, and much more conscious of ecological and social concerns.
It's not all over yet, of course. Presently the army is in control and many in the army have benefited from the old system and will be reluctant to cast it aside. But most Egyptians know full well that there is a risk of their hard work being undone, and they will continue protesting if the army tries to stand in the way of genuine democratic reforms.
Of course, some worry that those reforms are themselves the real danger, because they risk bringing to power people we do not like--i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood. While it is obvious to anyone not wearing ideological blinders that the MB did not start and was not the main driving force behind this revolution, they are at present the most organized opposition movement in Egypt and it is probable that they will have a significant role to play in any genuinely democratic government. There are several things to note here, though.
First, the MB are not Al-Qaeda. Most Americans know little or nothing about the MB, but find the name scary and so assume that they must be violent extremists. In fact, though many of the MB's goals are certainly not what we might like, they have repeatedly denounced violence in the service of them, and have made public commitments to democracy and the protection of religious minorities. Of course, it could be that these commitments are mere political posturing--but then, one can say that about all political parties' statements. I certainly don't relish the prospect of an Egyptian government led by the MB, but it's not the doomsday scenario some are portraying it is.
Second, as noted above, the protests themselves are nationalist, not religious, in nature, and most of those involved in them do not want to live in a theocracy. If the MB were to move the country in that direction, they would face a great deal of opposition.
Third, I think it can be predicted with virtual certainty that if the MB were to govern in an extremely conservative fashion, they would lose much of even the support they presently have. People support Islamist parties for many reasons, and not all of them involve agreeing with their overtly theocratic aims: for instance, Islamist parties tend to provide good social services, and they are seemingly credible alternative to corrupt regimes. Supporting autocratic regimes is about the safest way for the West to increase support for such movements in the Middle East and Muslim world. If we really want these groups to lose their popularity, we should give them a chance to govern. Then moderates will withdraw their support, and regular citizens generally will see that their policies simply don't work--and once in power, Islamist parties can no longer blame all their problems on the corruption of the ruling autocrats and on Israel and the West (or, at least, more people will see through such scapegoating).
So, I think that most of the possible outcomes of a genuine democratic transition are, in the end, positive:
(1) We get a government dominated by a secular party or parties.
(2) We get a government dominated by the MB, but the MB governs in a comparatively secular and moderate fashion.
(3) We get a government dominated by the MB, and the MB governs in a conservative and theocratic manner. As a result, they lose much of their support and are booted out of power.
The worst outcome, I think, is as follows:
(4) We get a government dominated by the MB, and the MB governs in a conservative and theocratic manner. They also undo the democratic reforms that brought them to power and make it impossible for the people to kick them out through legal means.
But even in this worst-case scenario (which I find unlikely, given the nature of the revolution), it's only a matter of time before we have another revolution, and when that happens, the Islamists will have practically no support. Even in Iran, touted as the analogue that is supposed to show that (4) is what will happen, I am confident that this will happen--Islamic fundamentalism is not popular among the ordinary citizens of that country today.
Given these outcomes, I can think of no credible reason for us to not support democratic reform wholeheartedly. Propping up more autocratic regimes would only foment more anti-American and pro-Islamist sentiments. The same goes for other Middle Eastern/North African countries. If we really want to defeat Islamic extremism, we should be supporting democracy all across the Muslim world.
Not all the news of the revolution has been positive, unfortunately. While the protests were primarily anti-Mubarak and not anti-Western, there was paranoia by some in the crowd of foreign influences, and there were several reports of attacks on foreign journalists (the most infamous was the attack on CNN's Anderson Cooper, but that was by pro-Mubarak thugs, not anti-government protesters). The night after Mubarak stepped down, Lara Logan of CBS was attacked and sexually assaulted. (Some have suggested that she was also attacked by pro-Mubarak forces, but that's not obvious to me.) Unfortunately, sexual harassment and assault, like inter-religious conflict, has been and continues to be a serious problem in Egypt. There are other aspects of Egyptian culture that are also seriously troubling: anti-Semitism and racism against black Africans, for example. (There's no point in pretending these aren't worse than in Western countries or drawing false equivalencies: these are serious problems in Egyptian culture that need to be dealt with.)
But I'm confident that all of these problems will have a better chance of being solved in an open democratic environment than the repressive autocratic one that has existed until now. In a free media, hopefully these issues will be discussed more openly and people who engage in such acts as religious intolerance and sexual harassment will be more openly condemned. This revolution demonstrated what the Egyptian people--Muslim and Christian, male and female, black and white (I haven't read as much about this aspect of the revolution, but saw several blacks--probably mostly Sudanese refugees--in pictures of the protests)--are capable of when they come together as one rather than defining themselves in opposition to each other. I'm hopeful that Egyptians will learn that lesson and overcome not only their political but also their cultural problems.
